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An Invitation 
Dear Reader, 
You are about to read a logbook of an .excursion through 
territory that may at first seem quite familiar. Before long, 
however, you may begin to wonder where you are and where the 
road is going. Perhaps a few signposts may relieve your 
uncertainty. Let me begin with my conclusion: Religion is more 
of a mosaic than a simple picture created by one artist. Actually 
this final judgment depends on other notions met along the way. 
There are two such: 
1. That religion is not one homogeneous enterprise. 
2. If that is so, we are in a good position to 
appreciate my basic "argument." We can now 
look for religion on what I call the "human 
continuum," and that is where this excursion is 
taking us. 
But, why now? Because we live now in a culture in which 
we cannot avoid the power and presence of the "scientific 
method." Finding religion on the ''human continuum" means 
simply that it is-pardon the repetition--a human phenomenon. 
In my judgment, however, this does not diminish the necessity 
and the power of religion. Rather, it allows us to extend the 
boundaries of our humanity. 
For now it is clear that human beings have the 
opportunity of living in at least three dimensions: 
1. Individual human beings have physical bodies: 
biological marvels that organize star dust into 
amazing sentience. 
2. We have mental worlds in which we can take off 
on unpredictable adventures-creating ourselves 
and our histories 
3. And we have, as aspects of those mental worlds, 
imaginations that can see and know realities that 
are both invisible and intelligible. 
Eventually, I tell myself, in order to climb the "Mount 
Everest of Religion" we need folks whose lives are lived on that 
"continuum" and are willing and able to assist in the climb 
toward the peak of that mountain. Still, I shall not be surprised if 
the "argument" of this book may seem more personal than you 
expected. I shall acknowledge, a little later, that "wherever one 
stands one occupies a position inside a worldview as well as 
inside the cosmos ... " We all explore the universe while 
occupying some place in it. I am willing to allow that this quasi 
confession applies to the author and accounts for, at least the 
appearance of, his being personal while he tries to find his way 
into the cosmos where we all ''live and move and have our 
being." To give the reader a choice I launch these essays with an 
Invitation from within a worldview where I venture to explore, if 
not the cosmos, then at least a tender piece of the behavior of a 
small part ofthe inhabitants ofthat cosmos. 
The purpose of the stream of essays that follows is not to 
disparage religion nor to persuade adherents of particular 
traditions or those drawn to "religion in general" that they are at 
table with a Feast of Fools. It is to make the case that religion, 
like so many other personal experiences and components of 
culture, is a more complex and interesting reality than it seems 
to be in the realm of ordinary public discourse. Even its location 
and function in a cultural matrix cannot be accounte<l, for by a 
single "cause," whether supernatural, psychological, or historical. 
Any and all religious traditions bear the marks of their location, 
their cultural context, their place in a historical epoch, their 
psychological and social effects, their intellectual content, their 
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personal satisfactions, and their interpretation by gifted or 
desperate individuals. 
Religion is no less complicated a perspective on life, 
person'\! or collective than, for example, the economy or a 
prevailing political system. I suspect that any and all such 
entanglements of our common "forms of life" lead often to a 
singular human moment. Sooner or later we discover the one 
reality that defines the human species on this planet: our 
mortality. And if nothing else, religious behavior eventually 
hits that wall and either climbs over it with ingenious athleticism 
or falls back in at least temporary despair. 
For the contemporary atheists, it seems, our mortality is 
the singular fact that defines our humanity. For those who deny 
any superordinate reality there is no future beyond our human 
careers so there was no past that inflicted on us an unjust finale 
to our existence. I want to argue, however, that it is the 
ingenious "fictions of coherence" (more on this later) that the 
religious imagination conjures to cope with the despair that 
atheists prefer to ignore. 
Here I must protest that the atheists' polemics do not 
"prove" that the conjurations of the religious imagination lack all 
existential value. Religious experience and historical traditions 
are not false or useless simply because the rhetoric that expresses 
them is not "objective." 
Edwin Dobb (a former editor of The Sdences) offers the 
following critique of objectivity: " ... wherever one stands one 
occupies a position inside a worldview as well as inside the 
cosmos, creatures of a two fold creation." 1 He goes on to refine 
this observation: "Despite claims to objectivity, physics [with the 
other sciences] is a sophisticated, highly specialized attempt to 
humanize the world." 2 Finally, with a touch of ambiguity, he 
assures us that the human story assumes the shape oflonging. 
Human longings, however are not uniform. Neither the 
subjectivist nor the objectivist can claim exclusive certainty for 
their truths. These excursive essays, like all human efforts, are 
essays-attempts-toward appreciating the ambiguity of the 
brain/mind's ingenuity in simply making sense of the parade of 
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perceptions, the swarm of ideas, the circus of hopes that define 
our responses to the uncertainties, the ambiguities that drive us 
into our human futures. As I suggested above, religious 
experience and historical traditions are not false or useless 
simply because the rhetoric that expresses them is not 
"objective." 
Now I must protest further that I do not have any 
intention to defend religion either as a historical or a 
psychological phenomenon. Its persistence in varied versions of 
reimagining our world may tempt the philosopher and the 
scientists to attack or defend it. Neither response to finding 
religion "alive and well" and proliferating or evolving or 
withering away has any appeal for me. I take "religion" as a 
given in the global environment, making its appearance on the 
double stage of history and nature, as both personal experience 
and as complex traditions. Such traditions provide "fictions of 
coherence" that are embedded between human consciousness 
and the curious imagination. Here we find mind negotiating 
with brain in order to prompt humans to live into their futures 
while holding onto and imagining pictures of the world that 
contain traces from the past or expectations of a fluid present. 
I am tempted to end this invitation with an analogy-a 
parable-of how humans struggle to balance the temptation as 
participants and as observers in the ordinary course of living. 
Take Soccer as an instance. There is, of course, the International 
Game that we can observe on the great pitches where pros play 
The Game. But then, there is the "home team," that draws us in 
as participants-not actually in uniform kicking the ball, but still 
as emotionally and in our imagination "playing" the local version 
ofthe Game of Games. Religion is the same kind ofreality. We 
can watch it and we can "play" it. My strategy in this book is to 
appreciate the ambiguity and at the same time try to describe it 
as both a universal in human history and an experience that 
engages us as individuals. It is both an objective and a 41Ubjective 
phen?menon. Certain aspects of religion satisfy complex needs 
and desires of human individuals and at the same time enable us 
to live as members of the human race. Our understanding of 
religion is best realized when we concede that it is not a simple 
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homogeneous phenomenon. Today it is for any one of us an 
opportunity to be part of whatever it is; tomorrow it may occupy 
our consciousness as The Game of Games. ~ 
Por a moment let me shift the metaphor from game-
oriented to a trip through unfamiliar territory. As we try to 
understand the phenomenon of religion, we should be aware of 
how we travel through its territory. As we maneuver our way 
through this wonderful, varie.d world of ideas and experience, we 
surely must notice-as participants-that for us humans, religion 
maintains a narrative of ancient memories that tempt us to 
interpret life as a reassurance that the universe is ultimately both 
a safe place to live and at the same time promises a destiny that 
transcends human mortality. In short, for participants-whether 
as solo individuals or as adherents of a historic community-
religion is the repository of fictions and wisdom that persuade us 
that existence makes sense-and constrains us to certain 
behaviors both as individuals and as participants in social 
processes. 
Those in the mode of observers, on the other hand, may 
maintain a degree of detachment that spares them such 
opportunities. Religion for them is more or less uncomplicated 
by doubts and uncertainties, as well as prospects of 
transcendence-of communion with what is other than life on 
Monday morning. 
So these experiential modes tell us that there are at least 
two perspectives on the same thing. There are those persons 
involved in religion as an ineluctable presence, a complex and 
varied phenomenon, a multi-faceted mosaic rather than a stone 
wah that ·invites collision. Then there are the observers for 
whom religion is what preoccupies those who dream, at best 
hopefully, of what lies beyond the ordinary and prompts 
unfulfillable hopes of an existence that only seems to go beyond 
Monday morning. 
Perhaps it comes down to this: For the participant 
religious experience hears the echo of the universe 3, for the 
observer there is at most the sound oflife in the ordinary. 
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The person addressing the reader values with some 
reluctance both perspectival modes, confident, however, that 
religion is not a single homogeneous enterprise, rather a carillon · 
than a single bell. This book tries to appreciate this ambiguity. 
To accomplish this, I begin by supposing that the 
question, ''Is that all there is?" offers an otherwise self-satisfied 
imagination an open playing field. Then I allow two 
contemporary poets to test the limits of such a rhetorical 
question. 
While still confronting our inability-or hesitancy-to 
resolve the question, I venture to challenge what I can only call 
the belief paradigm that provides the rhetorical gestures of 
ordinary religious discourse. In the place of this habit of mind, I 
argue that it is (special) human relationships that persuade us to 
launch further inquiry and continue to navigate the waters of 
what we too easily call religious experience. 
Of course, that experience in one way or another must 
allow us to cope with or casually invoke the concept of a 
superordinate reality into the struggle for certitude as we face a 
world crying out to be understood as our primary dwelling place. 
Then at last, I assemble an array of interpretive ideas 
under the figure of a Mosaic. The point of this strategy is to 
allow that religion (as, for example, the economy) is not a single 
homogeneous enterprise. As phenomenon, religion exhibits a 
subtle variety of effects on the course of our human lives. We 
can only begin to appreciate these effects by confronting 
religion's practical ambiguity: The adherents of religious 
traditions must face their existential reality and manage their 
penchant to confront ''the Wholly Other" (quite often, simply 
"God") while creating and maintaining their identity as human 
beings. 
In this effort to resolve religion into its various aspects I 
also propose that its most energetic facet is what ...I call its 
Wel~bild An easier, though less precise term would be its "world 
picture," that is, how one sees--how one contemplates--his or her 
world. 
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My best hope is that these excursions will both preserve 
and refme this pervasive reality that haunts our minds, consoles 
our emotions, and allows us to appreciate-sometimes casually, 
other t.Unes with serious intensity-at least something of the 
mystery of our humanity. 
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Chapter One 
A Question Shall Lead Us 
''Is that all there is?" 
(Peggy Lee, 1969) 
In our time, it seems, religion suffers a crisis of identity. 
It no longer has a consistent referent in the arena of public 
discourse. The shadow that it casts in history depends on a host 
of variables. Is it a personal experience; is it a communal 
phenomenon? A flood of natural and temporal circumstances, it 
seems, obscures the track it leaves along the course of human 
history. Can we name it as though it were a singular 
phenomenon? Does it claim its right to be what it is or do its 
human adherents define it as they use it for uncertain purposes? 
Madeline Albright, in her book The Mighty and the 
Almighty, struggling in the face of the "East-West" encounters of 
religious traditions, finally acknowledges, 'The years have not 
brought me certainty about religion." 1 Then in a confessional 
moment, she asserts, ''I am a hopeful Christian [She was born 
Jewish and raised Catholic.] but an inadequate one, with doubts. I 
respect other religions because I think they are reaching for the 
same truth, though from a different angle." 2 Such a statement, of 
course, exhibits perhaps more confusion about "religion" than 
bon tide understanding. 
I begin with Madeline Albright's reflections, however, 
because they are current and offered by a person in the public 
arena. I cite them also because they reflect the uncritical 
perspective of Gandhi and others whose interests are more 
political than philosophical. It is really the statement, "The years 
have not brought me certainty about religion," that piques my 
frustration. If one tunes into the public discourse about religion 
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it is clear that such a statement should be made by most 
journalists as well as so-called pundits. But it is the philosopher 
in me that has grown weary of the rhetorical reflexes in all such 
talk about religion. This unrelenting stream of talk about 
religion provokes in me despair at refining the rhetoric that 
scrambles religion, faith, belief, spirituality, and other 
conventional terms as though their referents were consistent 
with each other and generally agreed upon. I am sure that other 
concepts suffer from the same casual usage. Consider the 
ambiguity of such notions as "the economy," "art," "politics," 
"culture," and the like when they appear in public talk. I leave it 
to others to venture to bring such notions under critical scrutiny. 
My choice is to run against the stream of talk about religion, 
trying to introduce at least a modicum of consistency. It is 
tempting also to try to restore an appreciation of this complex 
phenomenon that seems so simple when it enters the realm of 
public discourse. 
This motive is justified especially when we observe what 
happens when that old encounter between religion and science 
appears on the scene. According to the court transcript of the 
2004 trial on teaching "intelligent design" in biology courses in 
the Dover, Pennsylvania public schools, a significant amount of 
time was given to "defining" science. No comparable effort was 
given to "defining" religion; a commonsense, conventional, 
uncritical under-standing of religion pervaded the testimony. 
So it is with great sympathy and tolerance that I observe, 
in the context of Albright's rumination, that there is seldom any 
effort to deal critically with the .disparities between the rhetoric 
of religious traditions and the multi-faceted reality that swings 
steadily between the personal and the institutional, between the 
historical and the transcendental, between the fictional and the 
verifiable. It is the unresolved dualistic bias, overriding critical 
reflections, that more often · than not shapes and defines 
"religion" in the public realm. The result, personal "~fmitions" 
of Eeligion displace, by default, any attempt at critical 
understanding. And why not? What I believe is what I believe 
and others do or should believe as well. As we shall see, it is the 
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very notion of ''belief' in most religious discourse-as well as 
discourse about religion-that creates an aura of ambiguity. 
In search of some road to clarity with regard to religion, 
then, ~here should we start? Perhaps with a "scientific" 
observation. Like certain kinds of trees religion has the 
capability to self-hybridize, that is, to create variants of itself that 
are distinctive. So, when we approach the fact of religion, we 
should be prepared to find a "vital" reality that requires ingenuity 
to understand. From this perspective, religion requires an 
approach that does not call on a simple or singular philosophical 
viewpoint. 
"Religion," then, has entered the realm of public 
discourse as an objective dynamic while at the same time it 
preoccupies individuals as subjective experience. Surely such a 
phenomenon should be approached with more curiosity than 
certainty. If we insist on being philosophical in our approach, we 
should let the reality of the thing advise us how we might 
appreciate it. 
We should suppose, then, that the phenomenon of 
religion is not only something in itself but also involves real 
persons in subjective experience-whether one's own or that of 
others. So, when we observe religion in all of its objectivity, we 
must be ready to meet it on its own terms. This means, but only 
in part, that we must be prepared to encounter the presumed 
Other that haunts religion's own history and haunts the human 
psyche as well. Religion, however we define it, presents us with 
the shadow of god, a superordinate being or beings-though this 
reality is, in human terms, overwhelmed by other aspects of 
experience that allow (or require) the adjective "religious." 
Hence we should have at our disposal a variety of tools that 
permit not only dissection but also excavation, not only 
understanding but also appreciation. For the best outcome of 
this inquiry, then, we should probe both for "religion's" essence 
and manifestation as we encounter its immediate reality in 
history and personal experience. 3 
Religion for the philosopher, then, is not simply game to 
be hunted for a trophy, nor merely a greenhouse of orchids to be 
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admired for their idiosyncratic charm. It is rather like an entire 
ecosystem in which life evolves through time. We must be 
prepared to encounter religion in its several aspects, entangled in 
the modalities of human behavior and thought as well as in the 
political and social processes that preoccupy human beings 
wending their way through history. 
In order to appreciate the rich ambiguity of "religion" 
that is given to any philosophical venture, let us acknowledge the 
conundrum that religious traditions confront: Who among us 
knows enough to solve the mystery that infuses our many efforts 
to know who we are, what we are and where we are? On the 
other hand who among us knows enough to be absolutely certain 
that we do not know enough to answer those questions? 
Perhaps if we place ourselves at the intersection of 
certainty and uncertainty, setting aside belief as not much more 
than subjective illusion, a stopgap that simply holds off 
confusion and any need to deal carefully with the ambiguities 
embedded in such utterances as Madeline Albright's, we would 
recognize the basis for both the existential and metaphysical 
versions of these questions. There may be, however, an easier 
way to extricate ourselves from sue~ a philosophical tangle. The 
clue to this prospect may lie in a quite unexpected moment. 
When I first heard it evoked in a casually "philosophical" 
conversation, the refrain of a popular song was introduced in the 
give and take and immediately reverberated in my 
consciousness: "Is that all there is?" I had no idea of the source of 
that exclamatory question. 
It turns out that it was a rhetorical question in the refrain 
of a popular song sung by Peggy'Lee in 1969. Even before the 
version by Peggy Lee, however, there is evidence that the 
question was inspired by the 1896 story, Dissillusionment by 
Thomas Mann, adapted by Leiber and Stoller and broadcasted in 
San Francisco in 1964. Still more recent evidenco.. of how 
tempting the question is can be found in the The New Yorker, 
August 15, 2012. James Wood, a critic at large, wrote an essay 
Secula.rism and its Discontents and entitled it, "Is That All There 
Is?" 
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This unanswerable - rhetorical - question jolted my 
rational imagination and took me beyond the Peggy Lee song 
itself. I need not quote the lyrics but the refrain itself should 
provide 4 basis for what I offer here as an apologia. By that I 
intend an explanation that warrants the use of the question in a 
critical task that may exceed the lyrics and the music of a "pop 
song." 
In one verse, after reil,liniscing about a house fire and a 
visit to the circus, she remembers a love affair some time in her 
life. Soon into the memory she recalls the moment: Her love 
went away abruptly and the surge of longing and fear hit her, 
"and I thought I would die," but she didn't. Then in a poignant 
philosophical moment she sang: 
Is that all there i~ is that all there is? 
ffthat's all there i~ my fiien~ then Jet's keep dancing. 4 
Epiphanies of the dancing mind that come unbidden still 
might focus thoughts otherwise blurred or obscure. I ventured 
to myself: Perhaps religious experience may be nothing more-
or nothing less-than the erie de cour in moments when reason 
and emotion are fully, mysteriously compatible; when insights 
create themselves out of immediate experience and the mind 
pirouettes with itself responsive, perhaps, to the music of the 
spheres. 
Dare I discern such thoughts in the lyrics of what seems a 
casual refrain in a poptilar song: "Is that all there is?" At such a 
moment the mind may fall back upon itself and from that 
subjective platform realize, whether desperately or ecstatically, 
that the question being asked opens doors upon inner and outer 
worlds. 
Still, the question is what it is. With this and countless 
other human utterances, one may claim the privilege of making 
it one's own. We 'then have a question, whatever its origin, that we 
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need not refuse, however faintly it may reverberate in the 
channels of a questing mind. 
This apologia is not simply a condescending gesture that 
says, "I'm sorry that you don't hear what I hear." It is rather a 
"word" to ward off misunderstanding, a reassurance that justifies 
a use that may not be immediately obvious. "Is that all there is?" 
In whatever other contexts it may have emerged, whatever the 
reasons for an original experiential moment, the question may 
carry the imagination beyond a casual state of complacency into 
unexplored territory of thought and intuition. Is it fair to talk 
about philosophical opportunism? Well, Peggy Lee and those 
others who raised it, whatever their personal intentions, have 
given us a bona fide opportunity to wax reflective. 
I was slightly relieved of any further worry when I found 
a reference to a song by Bob Dylan in a book with a clearly 
philosophical bias. Jennifer Hecht, in her book Doubt: A History, 
invokes a popular folk singer as a source for authentic 
philosophical reflection. I'll let the context justify the invocation 
of Dylan's song: 
Another huge difference between our human world and 
the universe as we know it is that, within the human 
world, as Bob Dylan sings, "Everybody's got to serve 
somebody." 5 
The serious "argument" expressed in the verse is that ''We are all 
inferior to someone in some areas." How many other unexpected 
sources may there be to guide one's reflection on life-or on 
religion? Is it too much to hqpe that, buried in unexpected 
places, we might find useful insights? 
"Is that all there is?" The reflective person may recognize 
here the great conundrum that philosophers have never fully 
resolved. What is the relation of how things appear and how 
._ 
things are? Kant's distinction still haunts rational discourse: The 
distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality. What 
things seem to be and what things are "in reality''? But one need 
not be the philosophical type to appreciate the confusion that 
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observatioh elicits. The cliche that so bothered Longfellow, by no 
means beholden to the likes of Kant, is not idle rhetoric: 
Tell me not in moumful numbe~ 
Lite is but an empty dream! 
For the soul is dead that slumbers., 
And things are not what they seem. 6 
Is it mere superstition or legitimate suspicion that "things 
are not what they seem"? The poet seems quite unwilling to 
concede the truth of this maxim. Even ordinary experience 
raises the specter of uncertainty. "Is that all there is?" Our 
wandering or preoccupied minds need not go too deep into 
immediate experience or too far into the imagined array of 
galaxies to stumble onto this query. The human imagination at 
its most vulnerable may still suspect that it is constantly rubbing 
up against only the veneer of reality. The actual seems 
con'cealed at least in part by a shadow. It is the great paradox of 
the indigenous tradition of Japan that the living Kami in a Shinto 
shrine is revealed most clearly by being hidden in the semi-
darkness of the inner sanctum. The ordinary mind may be 
restless until it finds some presumed rest in a divine presence. It 
is tempting to suppose, however, that such a presence is an 
illusion conjured by our desire to catch a glimpse of the ultimate 
panorama or to relieve the immediate pain of some vague 
uncertainty. One way or another, we cannot finally suppress the 
question, "Is that all there is?" May I risk at least the suggestion 
that it is a version of the "ultimate question" that sets the stage 
for religious experience in the sprawling array of religious 
traditions? 
Which brings us to the gateway guarded by those two 
sentinels of the philosophical enterprise. There at the entryway 
to the labyrinth within the Great Labyrinth, Question guards the 
answers and Answer guards the question. In the hallway beyond 
the entry we meet the twin couple Uncertainty and Certainty. 
Under their direction we meet two other guests, Mind and World, 
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inviting us to tour the universe that is our sometime home, 
determined to discover a "homology between heavenly and 
earthly events." 7 
Enough now of this rhetorical excess! Philosophy, not 
allegory, is the work at hand. Such work, however, need not lead 
us to the Museum of Philosophy and its docent whose only 
interest is history. There, it is true, in dimly lighted rooms we 
may contemplate what some philosophers have done, but we 
should also realize what any of us might do in sustained 
moments of curiosity and reflection. 
Try thinking of philosophers as swimmers in the Ocean 
of Reality. In moments of panic-or in the throes of 
uncertainty-what might a swimmer do, especially when the 
waves threaten to pull him under or sweep him away? A choice, 
I think, presents itself when the philosopher-swimmer confronts 
"religion" disguised as the presumptive Answer to questions that 
threaten to overwhelm his casual breaststroke. It is also possible 
that "religion" may draw us to the shore of an unexplored land; 
only to strand the swimmer in a world he imagined he was 
struggling to transcend. 
Against the background of such uncertainty I shall not 
presume to explain the phenomenon of Religion. I prefer rather 
to evoke an appreciation for this two-edged experience. The 
questions that follow take us in that direction. They cover a wide 
array of what the religion is that inhabits a privileged place on 
the human continuum. I am sure there are more than five that 
may help us chart the religious adventure of the human species. 
1. Are its roots experiential or noetic? 
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Religious folks can hardly resist presuming certain 
knowledge. Surely experience tempts us at least to hope that 
our minds are not simply adrift in a sea of final un't:ertainty. 
Feeling; imagination~ intuition~ even guesses add up to a 
sense of being somewhere and sometime in the universe. 
Even temporality offers us some sense of noetic potency. We 
know we are histOiy. 
~ 
2. Is revelation a subjective or an objective event? Or is a 
claim for "revelation" necessary to other religious 
claims or experience? 
We can hardly resist "connecting the dots» of experience. 
Our subjectivity is resdessly determined that we live in a 
world that is at least hopef'ul, if not certain~ about being in an 
intelligible universe. There is alwa~ fOr human beings, a 
mental wind blowing back the veil of ignorance. 
3. Are religious traditions radically idiosyncratic or do 
they tend toward universality? 
There are two pathways through this conundrum. Evezy 
religious tradition has its own integrity; origin and 
configuration. It is distinctive if not unique. Personal 
experienc~ on the other hand, often finds it impossible to 
resist the notion of a universal way of being human. We 
suppose we are all on pathways that eventually converge. We 
also can hardly resist an unceitain confidence that the course 
of life is teleologically 8 determined Or is it? 
4. Is there a common psychological template for the 
varieties of religious experience or does it depend on an 
individual's location in time and place? 
MysticS; neurologists and psychologists wresde with this 
puzzle. Certain philosophers have also thrown their hats into 
the ring. But when you assemble the variety of religious 
traditions that have smfaced in the course of human history. 
one can hardly expect to make the case that Japanese Shinto 
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and Chinese ConfUcianism are based on a single version of 
universal "spirituality." But among the monotheisms, 
including Zoroastrianism and the Solar religion of Egypt, it is 
easier to describe the systematic and imaginative differences 
among them. And then there are the religious traditions of 
what we now group together as belonging to "indigenous 
folks." "Where in such a 'template" would we find the 
beginnings of the Dreamtime of the Australian aborigines? 
But even though the psychological template might elude 
research, it seems to me presumptuous to say that there may 
not be some commonality overarching the historical 
differences. 
5. Is religion primarily a social phenomenon or does it 
originate in solo moments and then ineluctably tempt 
others to imitate it-however imperfectly? 
I am tempted to take shelter in a paradox: Religious 
traditions may have their beginning often enough in the 
experience of specific individuals, but given the universal 
human impulse to find others with whom to share work and 
feelings, what eventually emerges at specific times and places 
are traditions as social phenomena. But it would be reckless 
to insist that there can be no examples of bona fide solo 
religious experience. 
There is virtually no end to the string of queries that 
enmesh "religion" as reflective :Quman beings observe it. When 
one is drawn into the web, the strands proliferate in a wondrous 
tangle that could easily discourage further inquiry. Still the 
weave taunts us to tease it apart-or perhaps tempts us to cut the 
Gordian knot with whatever tool might be at hand. Surely, 
however, we cannot gainsay the fact of religion, even 'tf we sense 
how: fragile and varied a fact it is. Fact? Yes, even though we 
might argue that it often plays fast and loose with many other 
facts of the world in which we find it. 
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The dilemma deepens in the presence of this 
phenomenon that we should reflect upon. What, in fact, does one 
reflect on when religion becomes an object of inquiry or 
contem~ation? Such reflection necessarily requires binocular 
vision. When one thinks about religion one ipso filcto thinks 
about oneself as much as she thinks about the world in which 
both reflect each other? But whatever the motive or method, the 
goal is clear: To appreciate the complexity of this "simple" 
reality that haunts history and the mind that contemplates that 
reality. 
After many years of reflecting on "religion"-both as 
experienced and as observed, both as felt reality and as 
phenomenon-! venture to exercise candor and at the same time 
maintain a degree of intellectual integrity. How may I maintain 
such a balance? Shall I presume to explain the phenomenon or 
shall I presume to justifY the experience? Surely it is possible to 
defme the term and to elucidate the concept without performing 
a dissection that leaves the real thing dismembered and (maybe) 
lifeless? 
This is not an idle question, given the attention now being 
directed by neuroscience even to questions about religion. 
Among all the critics that I might invoke to throw light on this 
trend, Gary Greenberg puts himself in the middle of this version 
of the business of science. The question he wrestles with is 
"Where is the you in the you when the brain is subjected to 
neurological examination and explanation?" 9 In more 
conventional terms, where is that part of this person (me or you) 
that is capable of some presumed religious experience? 
Imagining that (distant?) day when neuroscience has charted and 
excavated the brain and discovered the mind in that organism-
and the seat of transcendence, if such there is-Greenberg 
laments the consequences: 
Of course, I think my grandchildren . . . will be 
missing out on something . . . . And if I complain out 
loud to the whippersnappers [read, neuroscientists] 
whose brains will no doubt have been trained and 
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bettered and perhaps even perfected, the loss I will 
regret the most is the uncertainty, the not knowing how 
the mind emerges from the brain, and the teasing 
possibility that there is something else lurking among 
my molecules. 10 
Mind I Brain I Religion: Should we trust a scientific 
explanation of that triad? And if "religion" is a function of 
(depends on) the organic mind/brain singularity, would it not 
tempt us to consider "religion" a neurological condition-and 
even, perhaps, pathological-especially given the historical 
behavior of some religious folks? Is it possible (as certain 
contemporary atheists insist) that religion is indeed a sickness of 
the human species? But how many doctors have presumed to 
treat this, ailing patient-if in fact it is ailing? How many 
shamans have attempted to revive the moribund client? How 
many priests have celebrated its vitality? Many, of course, would 
deny that religion requires any treatment at all, while others 
would insist that it is time to let it go the way of other relics of 
the desperate human imagination. Of course, there are also 
those whose lives would wither on the vine if they felt their 
religion dissolving into modernity. 
The phenomenon of religion, however, is not exhausted 
by personal experience. It is also the context of serious truth 
claims. Even then the question pushes our minds and 
imaginations: Is the Truth of religion revealed or is it as much a 
conjuration of human ingenuity as any other system that 
interprets and enables human experience? But perhaps religion 
is as much an effect of human culture as, for example, is "the 
economy" -or are both a priori realities that are themselves 
causes of historical cultures? Does the human imagination 
create religion or does religion force the human mind to imagine 
a world-or rather a picture of a world-ofmultiple vistas? 
From what vantage point do we best unddlstand the 
oce8J1 of religion? From the wet sands at the edge of the ocean or 
while breasting the waves that at once hold us up and threaten to 
overwhelm us? Do we appreciate the song of religion by singing 
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it or hearing it; is it best to be part of the chorus or to take the 
podium to direct it? How does being "religious" enable or shape 
our relationship with the world whose picture we harbor ii'l our 
imaginatJ.cms? 
In the essay by Edwin Dobb cited earlier we find insights 
that add an extra dimension to this question. Dobb reminds us 
that: "Precisely when we grasp the vastness of the universe we 
also glimpse an equally vast interior." 11 The philosopher 
especially should be sensitive to this exercise of the "binocular 
mind" that we may not even recognize: The mind that sees the 
world while it sees itself seeing that world. More often than not 
ordinary experience does not force any such realization upon us. 
Still the mind cannot avoid the dilemma that catches us in the 
web of uncertainty when we confront the universe with any hope 
of a perfectly clear picture that satisfies both our reflex 
subjectivity and our desperate effort at objectivity. Dobb 
ingeniously discovers the limits to perfect understanding that 
may disconcert some of us, at least as we seek religious insight 
without turning our backs on the scientific culture. We should 
let him say it once more: 
We now know that we do not occupy the center of the 
universe, but we sometimes forget that we will always 
stand at the center of our picture of the universe. 12 
Eventually the web of questions, the tangle of alternatives 
may induce either fatigue of reason or weariness of spirit. 
Neither cognitive anodyne nor a sleeping potion for the soul 
gently relieve the pain or turmoil of inquiry. Nor can the will 
itself easily determine that we simply walk away., The ghosts of 
worry and doubt haunt some of us while awake or asleep, while 
hope wrestles with the irrepressible desire for certitude. We 
witness the strange, improvised dance of Doubt and Belief, while 
knowledge taunts faith and religion begins to shimmer like a 
phantasm ofthe imagination and then perhaps comes into focus 
as a solid reality that only a fool would risk denying. 
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As modems forget to remember what they once were, the 
primitive and unsophisticated perhaps never forget what they 
remember. "Religion" is a habit of mind for most of us and a 
thorn in the flesh for many others. It is more often a reality that 
most cannot deny-as well as an illusion that many want not to 
be lured by. 
When it surfaces in public discourse, is the occasional 
denial of religion simply a negative preference? But why should 
a mere personal preference against religion be justified over 
against the evidence of religion's persistence as a historical 
phenomenon? If we were to take a poll on the question, "Is 
religious truth a reality in the cosmos?" the number of "yeas" 
would surely swamp the "nays." So what? Is the reality of a 
world dependent on the agreement of opinions for or against its 
reality? 
If these meandering thoughts seem tedious, I can only 
say that I speak here and now. My ruminations are provoked by 
the voice of public discourse as well as by the private voices of 
piety and belie£ Religion is perhaps no longer what it was; 
though there are many who are desperate to preserve it for what 
they presume (or remember) it was. Of course, it still is what it 
was and at the same time it is becoming something else-though 
perhaps the "something else" is at least an aspect of what it 
always was. 
Is the ambiguity that I have just rehearsed only self-
inflicted? Or is it a bona fide response to current culture? 
Should we not simply respect the aura of other-worldliness that 
accompanies every and all religions? But is it not that very aura 
that provokes us in the here and now to recognize the confusion 
of our situation? The canons of scientific knowledge are devoid 
of other-worldliness. 12 Still, the skeptic may ask, "Are we human 
beings inescapably denizens of only the natural world?" Is there 
nothing else even in our humanity that lures the natural mind-
in both its rational and imaginative modes-to con,emplate a 
"something" or "somewhere" beyond itself? The question again 
springs to the surface: "Is that all there is?" 
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The question snares us in a dilemma: Not even our most 
intense contemplation of the beyond necessarily convinces the 
universe to be what we suppose it is. Does our thinking actually 
mock t~ cosmos or does the cosmos mock our thinking? 
Perhaps religion really is an opiate, an illusion or, worse, no more 
than a decoration that we admire only because we contrived it. Is 
it a poetic expression of personal experience or a final word 
spoken by the "Wholly Other," disguised as prophet or mystic? 
But suppose we had never indulged ourselves in such a 
habit of mind. Would it then be necessarily true that there is 
nothing for us not to contemplate? Is it possible that Piet Rein's 
conundrum reflects the truth both of human thought and of the 
world it addresses: 
A bit beyond perception's reach 
I sometimes believe I see 
That life is two locked boxes, 
Each containing the other's key. 13 
Quietly I hear reason scratching at the wall of what may 
be its own prison. It seems to be saying to itself: "I should stop 
now. This prison is only my natural self and that self is what I 
am, though haunted by a beyond that I conjure with a certainty 
that I have discovered what really exists." But there is another 
ghost that whispers, "Believe that what you believe is true, for 
why would you believe what is not true." Still a third ghost stirs 
its sheets and talks back, "You know in your heart of hearts that 
your reason is ingenious enough to fool itself with its own 
beliefs. It can conjure knowledge that persuades itself of its own 
certainty-and hence can entertain beliefs that may not be true, 
while at the same time struggling to reconcile itself to its own 
limits." 
Perhaps, after all, the "beyond" that tempts human 
experience is both a subjective and an objective reality. And the 
pendulum of thought measures time, but only within eternity 
and alludes to eternity from among the interstices of time. Is it 
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possible that the beyond is within and that same pendulum of 
thought measures itself while it maintains itself with the hope 
that it participates in eternity? 
Having woven this web too tightly, I should now venture 
a coda that may take us to the real starting point of my 
ruminations. We shall begin our last moments at a well's edge 
with Robert Frost, whom Mark Van Doren called "a philosophical 
poet" whose "profound and delicate heart was joined to an 
intellect which never ceased to search for the ultimate meaning 
oflife." 14 
For Once, Then, Something 
Others taunt me with having knelt at well-curbs 
Alwap wrong to the light; so never seeing 
Deeper down in the well than where the water 
Gives me back in a shining surface picture 
Me myself in the summer heaven, godlike, 
Looking out of a wreath of fern and doud puffs. 
Once, when trying with chin against a well-cur~ 
I discerne4 as though, beyond the picture, 
'Iflrough the picture, a something white, uncertain, 
Something more of the depths-and then I lost it. 
Water came to rebuke the too dear water, 
One drop fell nom a fern, and lo. a ripple 
Shook whatever it was lay there at bottom 
. 
Blurred it; blotted it out. What was that whiteness? 
Truth? A pebble of quartz? For once, then, something. 15 
In the well of thought the human discerns it!'elf seeing 
itself beyond itself. And if Frost is correct, it sees "something 
white, uncertain, something more of the depth." Not only do we 
humans think "the beyond within," but perhaps also the "within 
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beyond." What else should we do than exclaim, "For once, then, 
something," whether the "something" is our self or Another? Is it 
not sensible that philosophical reflection on "religion" sHould 
start ther~ at the opening of the enigma? When such reflection 
discerns "whatever it was lay there at bottom," even though it 
were "blurred," ''blotted ... out," perhaps we can do nothing less 
than suffer the thoughts that define our identity as human 
beings. 
For Robert Frost perception seems to allow one almost 
desperately to see "something" where there may be nothing. 
There may be one consolation, however paradoxical: The well 
into which Frost peers has a bottom where he can catch a 
glimpse of what may be there, even if only to imagine it. Still for 
Frost, our longing seems to allow the mystery at least to appear 
to be "something." 
Another poet, Philip Larkin, allows himself not even that 
much reassurance. The mystery is not "something" but in reality 
is "nothing." That judgment is not as rare as believers may 
suppose. Not only Marxists or existentialists are tempted to warn 
those with a confidence in certain religious truths that their 
minds are deluded even while held captive by hope. Larkin in his 
poem "Aubade" reflects on: 
The sure extinction that we travel to 
And shall be lost in always. Not to be here, 
Not to be anywhere, 
And soon; nothing more terrible, nothing more true. 16 
In Larkin's case, one of his commentators fmds that the 
poet is responsive to the honesty he hears in the Blues musical 
tradition. 
The banning of other worldliness [by the poet] is in part 
a consequence of the blues' honesty-trouble is not so 
easily evaded as the church pretends-but secularism is 
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also a necessary ingredient in the state of mind without 
which the blues could not exist. If religion could 
resolve the worry of which the bluesman sings, then the 
most fundamental of the blues conventions and 
attitudes would be undermined. 17 
As Leggett reads "Aubade," the poet invokes a "blues" attitude 
with which to confront the ordinary fears that religious 
convictions presume to deny. He argues, "the method of the 
poem is an honesty so plain that religion and logic seem 
contrived against it." 18 He refers to "Aubade's" third stanza: 
This is a spedal way of being alTaid 
No trick dispels. Religion used to try, 
That vast moth-eaten musical brocade 
Created to pretend we never die. 19 
For Larkin religion is not so much an illusion but more a 
decoration that we create or contrive. The imagery is rare but 
the sentiment is not: "That vast moth-eaten musical brocade" is 
only a pretentious antique in face of Frost's "something more of 
the depths." The ghost ship of religion navigates an endless sea, 
discovering not even ''that whiteness" that Frost may have seen. 
Even if not quite an opiate, for Larkin religion is still "The 
anesthetic from which none come around." 
Both poetic evocations raise doubts that religious 
experience relies on an objective reality authorized by a system 
of religious beliefs. Might not the philosopher take warning 
from the artist that religion's promise of reasonable certainty is 
at best dubious? Neither Frost nor Larkin seems willing to give 
into religious belief as carrying with it any warrant of truth. 
Larkin pays no heed to a definition of religion tha5 presumes 
cet1ainty of belief; Frost, with some reluctance, at least allows 
that the mind might entertain the mystery-which may or may 
not be a gesture toward affirming what we may normally think 
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of as religious belief. Is there no way to grasp religious 
experience other than as a response to historical conventions that 
seem to defme religion once for all as insisting that oui only 
option is..to "believe the unbelievable"? 
It is tempting to respond to this dilemma with 
conventional reason or dogmatic science as defining the limits of 
human experience. If we refuse to locate religion on the 
"human continuum," where does the rational imagination go? 
We are left only with the radical certainty of uncertainty. How 
then to appreciate the persistence of human religion in refusing 
surrender to a vision of a flat world devoid of authentic mystery 
and wonder-and its insistence in asking the question, "Is that all 
there is?" Even Bryan Magee seems unable-or certainly 
unwilling-to settle for such a loss. 
While tracking Bryan Magee through his philosophical 
confessions, two insights broke the surface for me. Magee was 
lamenting the fact that Tolstoy, when he decided that philosophy 
would yield "no ultimate answers," despaired of philosophy and 
embraced religion. Magee then tries to justifY his 
disappointment with the great artist: 
If even the crabbed skeptics admit that the statements 
of religion cannot be confuted by reason, why should I 
not believe in them, since they have so much on their 
side-tradition, the concurrence of mankind, and all the 
consolation they yield? Yes, why not? But do not 
deceive yourself into thinking that with such 
arguments you are following the path of correct 
reasoning. If ever there was a case of facile argument, 
this is one. Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe 
anything is derived from it. 20 
Magee picks up the cudgel again and wields it more 
precisely: 
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And that is the point: If we do not know, we do not 
know. Any talk about this opening up the way for faith 
is a dangerous playing with words. Ignorance is no 
justification for believing anything. 21 
May I entreat my reader to hear that last statement-but by 
shifting the emphasis within the proposition? For example, 
"Ignorance is no justification for believing anything." ''Ignorance 
is no justification for believing anything." "Ignorance is no 
justification for believing anything." And so forth, from first 
word to last and for combinations as well. 
As we draw closer to a broad and appreciative perspective 
on "religion," I shall argue that the most elemental religious 
experience is in fact not to be identified with belief-as it usually 
is in many of its invocations. Again Magee allows another 
insight to surface. He is discussing Heidegger's concept of the 
self: 
At the heart of the mystery [of the non-objective sel:(], it 
seems to me, must lie the relationship between the self 
and the empirical world in which it is not an object. In 
fact I am tempted to believe that the ultimate mystery 
is the relationship between the self and the empirical 
world. 22 
I shall grant Magee his right "to believe" what he wants 
to. After all, perhaps the assertion of such a belief is little more 
than a convenient rhetorical gesture. But the insight is so 
compelling that I am inclined to ~inker ever so carefully with his 
statement. I would prefer to locate the "ultimate mystery" in the 
selfs experience of its relationship with the empirical world. It 
would be interesting indeed to confront Frost and especially 
Larkin with such a judgment. 
In the next chapter, I shall test the po~ibility of 
(re)defining "religion" in experiential terms rather than accept 
the interpretive paradigm that presents "religion" as captured by 
or expressed in simple utterances of belief. I trust that, so far, I 
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have set the stage for philosophical reflections that avoid that 
quite limited way of understanding a phenomenon that is 
historical and psychological, and at the same time alludes to the 
possibili~of transcending the very empirical world in which it is 
firmly planted. 
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